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Because of the booming economy, interest in China has soared in recent years.  The 
government has decided to privatize many state-owned enterprises (SOEs), so foreigners 
can much more easily invest in existing firms than ever before.  Is it wise to consider 
investing in these SOEs?  Certainly, many have major problems. How sophisticated are 
Chinese manufacturing firms?  Do they understand modern principles of manufacturing 
strategy and supply chain management?  What is the level of installed technology, from 
traditional production planning systems, like MRP, to robotics?  This paper attempts to 
answer these questions based on a survey of 100 firms in the Shanghai area.  We 
surveyed state-owned enterprises, collective-owned enterprises and privately held firms, 
and we discovered some fascinating insights about their differences and their similarities. 
We discovered that the differences among the ownership types are generally 
insignificant, suggesting that our results are quite general.  We find that these firms are 
far more advanced using explicit manufacturing strategies than we had expected.  
However, they are not as advanced in supply chain management as many Western firms.  
They report significant communication with customers and suppliers – more with 
customers than suppliers – but the nature of the communication is often limited to one 
dimension, particularly on the downstream side.  Firms that communicate with customers 
tend to do so with suppliers as well.   
Keywords: Supply Chain Management, China, Manufacturing Strategy 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Interest in China has soared in recent years.  The Chinese economy has been booming, 
and multinational firms have been investing in China at a furious pace. Dong & Hu 
(1995) note that foreign direct investments (FDI) increased in China at an average annual 
rate of 40.7 percent between 1983 and 1993, reaching a high of 175% in 1993. Managers 
clearly see the immense opportunity of investing in a country with a population that 
exceeds 1.3 billion and an economy among the fastest growing in the world.  Amway, for 
instance, invested more than $100 million in China to pursue its strategy of direct, multi-
level selling.  Amway obtained a license to sell this way in 1995, and by 1997, Amway’s 
sales exceeded $180 million.  
However, not all stories have a happy ending, as arrangements are not necessarily 
stable.  For example, Amway faced a remarkable turnabout in 1998 when the government 
determined that Chinese consumers do not have a “mature and healthy consumption 
mentality,” and that China does not have the necessary legal system to effectively 
regulate the direct, multilevel marketing business.  Therefore, they removed Amway’s 
license.  Sales in 1998 fell to $8.4 million after the license was removed.  It appears that 
1999 will be the first year in two decades that FDI will actually fall, perhaps by more 
than 20% (--, 1999). 
Many companies have made millions in China, but many others have lost 
millions. Bureaucracy and uncertainty about how to manage in China combine to create 
huge problems. The Economist notes that what is needed is not more investment, but 
better investment.  Some foreign firms have not understood the competition, not only 
from foreign firms, but from domestic Chinese firms as well.  Whirlpool, for instance, 
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discovered that the Chinese appliance makers, Haier and Guangdong Kelon, had 
comparable technology, lower prices, and a much better sense of how to design products 
for the Chinese market (--, 1999).   
Having a partner can help smooth the process, and there are many Chinese firms 
currently available for sale.  Because the government has decided to privatize many state-
owned enterprises (SOEs), foreigners can invest much more easily in existing firms than 
ever before. In the fall of 1998, at the Ninth Annual Trade Fair in Harbin, 1078 small and 
medium-sized state-owned enterprises were offered for sale.  The provincial government 
even tried to give away some of the more distressed firms (Broadman 1999)!  A $50 
billion program of debt-for-equity swaps likewise is moving very slowly (Eckert 2000).  
Is it wise to consider investing in these SOEs?  Certainly, many have major problems.  
Steinfeld (1998) notes that SOEs suffer from overstaffing, low (or no) profitability, and 
low productivity.  This is a commonly held position.  In fact, we ourselves have argued 
thus (Pyke 1998a). 
This information raises the question of what the real story is. How sophisticated 
are Chinese manufacturing firms?  Do they understand modern principles of 
manufacturing strategy and supply chain management?  What is the level of installed 
technology, from traditional production planning systems (like MRP) to robotics?  This 
paper attempts to answer these questions based on a survey of 100 firms in the Shanghai 
area.  The study included state-owned enterprises, collective-owned enterprises and 
privately held firms. We developed a set of summary scales composed of multiple items 
which are described in Section 3.  Each element in each scale was measured on a 7-point 
scale.  The reliability as measured by the Chronbach ∝  was above the minimum level of 
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0.6 for every case but one. The survey employed three self reports of performance which 
have been shown to be reliable in a wide variety of settings and which produced a 
reliability measure of 0.81.   
In the next section, we present some general material about Chinese firms in the 
context of reviewing the relevant literature.  Then in Section 3, we discuss the 
methodology we used, and in Sections 4 – 6 present our results on manufacturing strategy 
and supply chain management, beginning in Section 4 with some general results and 
comments.  We conclude in Section 7. 
 
2. Literature Review 
2.1 Organization of Chinese Firms 
In China, the state sector includes enterprises that are state-run (State-Owned Enterprise) 
or collective-owned.  “State-run enterprise” is a shorthand term for the Chinese 
designator “enterprise under the ownership of all the people.”  These were  
• established and maintained with central government investment 
• overseen by central government authorities or their local representatives 
• included in central government plans that (1) specified allocations of funds and 
materials that the firm would receive from government sources and (2) set output 
targets for goods to be delivered to the state.   
Collectives are owned by the workers rather than by “all the people.”  Of the state-run 
enterprises and collectives, some (such as steel manufacturers) are large and centralized, 
and others are smaller and are owned by a town, county, or other administrative unit. 
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Today, many of these enterprises are undergoing major transition. Since 1996 
Beijing started implementing a strategy adopted in 1995 under which “the central 
government focuses its support and supervision on 1,000 of the largest state enterprises 
while granting local governments greater leeway to pursue ownership reforms in smaller 
state firms.  A substantial proportion of new bank lending in 1996, for example, went to 
300 large state enterprises selected as the best performers among the 1,000 ‘backbone’ 
enterprises.” ((--, 1997a), page iv)  The plan is to sell off all but 1,000 of the roughly 
305,000 SOEs; those that are not sold will be allowed to go bankrupt.  The 305,000 SOEs 
employ 100 million workers, receive 90% of bank loans, and account for 40% of 
industrial output.  Many are plagued by over capacity, running at an estimated average 
60% utilization, with perhaps 1/3 too many workers.  Half of them lost money in 1996 (--
, 1997b). 
The reforms mean several things.  The owner and the manager will no longer be 
the same, more autonomy will be given to management, firms will be forced to compete 
in the marketplace, and firms can change ownership structure.   
These reforms were intended to revitalize the SOEs.  However, it does not seem 
to be universally successful.  The 100,000 smaller SOEs could easily fail leading to 
millions of workers being laid off from SOEs (Roberts & Crock 1999).  Nevertheless, the 
process seems to be ongoing.  Jefferson (1999) notes that the number of SOEs fell from 
about 110,000 in 1997 to 64,700 in 1998.  Yet, in spite of the government’s statement 
that SOEs would be privatized, only 10-15 percent have been divested to the nonstate 
sector, and these are almost all small firms.   
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According to Broadman (1999) SOEs still show the effects of the controlled 
economy: 78 percent of SOEs indicated in a survey that their largest supplier was another 
SOE; and 60 percent indicated that their largest customer was another SOE.   
What about privately held firms?  There are many confusing ownership structures 
in China, including firms that claim to be village-owned, but in reality are privately-
owned, and firms that claim to be privately-owned, but in reality have large government 
involvement. On August 30, 1999, the government passed a law detailing the legal right 
to private-property ownership.  Even though Chinese President Jiang Zemin officially 
embraced private enterprise in 1997, owners had been reluctant to publicly acknowledge 
that they are in fact privately-owned.  Many called themselves “collectives” to avoid 
problems with the government. The number of private enterprises in Shanghai now 
exceeds 110,000, clearly indicating that fears of calling a business “private” have been 
declining.  The private companies can be large and sophisticated, and they face far fewer 
restrictions on hiring, firing, and responding to the market than their state-owned 
counterparts. Roberts, Prasso, & Clifford (1999), for example, describe a private 
company, with sales of $192 million and 1,200 workers, that makes large air conditioning 
systems for office buildings.   
Recently, Zeng Peiyan, the chairman of the State Development Planning 
Commission, said that China’s economy was relying too heavily on state spending, and 
that restrictions on privately held firms will be lifted.  For instance, private firms will 
now be granted increased access to bank loans and the capital markets, although they are 
not treated equally at this time (Browne 2000).  Nevertheless, discrimination against 
private firms and entrepreneurs remains strong (Zhu 2000). 
 6
2.2 Manufacturing and Logistics 
A number of authors have established frameworks for manufacturing strategy 
(Wheelwright 1984, Pyke 1997, and Silver, Pyke, & Peterson 1998, Chapter 2, for 
instance).  Most frameworks define four operations, or competitive, objectives – cost, 
quality, delivery and flexibility – which provide measurable targets for managers to 
pursue. The next level defines a set of management levers that can be used to achieve 
these objectives.  Examples of management levers include inventory, production 
planning, supply chain relationships, and facilities location and focus.  In developing our 
questionnaire, we followed the framework from Pyke (1997), which in turn is based on 
Wheelwright (1984). 
In the realm of manufacturing, Yu, Cochran, & Spencer (1998) survey 128 firms 
regarding total quality management (TQM) practices in China.  They note that TQM was 
mandated in various forms in 1978, 1980, and 1993.  For example, the Consumer Rights 
Protection Law gave customers the right to complain about, and to receive compensation 
for, inferior quality.  The 1993 Product Quality Law made producers responsible for their 
product quality.  Yu, et al discuss the current enthusiasm for ISO 9000 and note that 91% 
of the firms surveyed have TQM training, 90% have had TQM for more than 2 years, and 
95% have a separate quality department.  Apparently, 96% have implemented TQM.   
Robb & Xie (1998) survey foreign-invested enterprises in the Beijing area.  We 
shall discuss their results below and draw some interesting contrasts and similarities 
between Shanghai and Beijing.  Robb and Xie do not, however, examine supply chain 
management. 
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Luk (1998) surveys 1000 “channel members” in fourteen Chinese cities since 
1991 to gain insight into the marketing channel implications of distribution reforms in 
China.  This paper provides an historical overview of the changes in the past 20 years and 
discusses the problems of the old system and the emerging multi-channel competition.  It 
notes that China's distribution system is still inefficient because of “structural factors, 
such as inter-provincial and inter-ministerial relationships, the level of relatedness 
between two industries, inefficient administration procedures and overlaps in the roles 
and functions of different administrative organizations.” (page 65) 
Lihong & Goffin (1999) interview managers from six joint ventures in China.  
They identify four major problem areas: recruiting and training employees, supplier 
management (especially delivery problems), quality output, and achieving an effective 
business culture. 
Roh & Whybark (1993) survey Chinese and Korean firms, but they address 
manufacturing practice and tactics, rather than manufacturing strategy; and they focus on 
apparel and machine tool companies.  Other than these papers, we know of no other work 
that examines the operations strategy and tactics of manufacturing firms. Some case 
studies have described individual companies (Pyke 1998a, and Robb & Xie 2000), but we 
have not seen more systematic analysis. 
3. Methodology 
This section describes questionnaire development, sampling, interviewing, measurement 
and development of summary scales. 
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Questionnaire: The basis of our questionnaire was the framework for manufacturing 
strategy in Wheelwright (1984) and Pyke (1997) and the questionnaire used by Robb & 
Xie (1998) in a study of foreign-invested enterprises in the Beijing area.  This was 
complemented by questions from other research including Hum & Leow (1996) and by 
self-report performance measures used in China by Deshpande & Farley (1999a) and 
McDermott, Greis, & Fischer (1997).  The translated new items were added to the draft 
questionnaire which was back-translated to English by a research assistant familiar with 
Chinese practices in interview studies and with survey research methodologies in social 
research. After editing, the resulting questionnaire was pre-tested with senior 
manufacturing managers from five different firms, who were asked to respond to the 
questionnaire and to note any questions which posed any sort of problem – lack of clarity, 
sensitivity of the answers, etc.  The handful of problems thus identified were resolved in 
discussion with the pre-test subjects. 
 
Sampling: The sample of firms was drawn from registers of businesses in Shanghai 
maintained by the market research firms for their business-to-business projects. 
Interviewers reported that 92 percent of the original sample was contacted and that 80 
percent of these contacts produced useful interviews, yielding 100 firms for our study.  
The 100 firms interviewed were limited to manufacturers which were State-Owned 
Enterprises (57 firms), Collectives (27), or Privately-owned (15). Industry representation 




Interviewing: Personal interviews with senior manufacturing executives were conducted 
by the staff of an international market research firm who specialize in research in 
business-to-business settings.  The interviews were held in the offices of the respondents.  
Prior appointments were made by telephone for the interviews. 
 
Measurement: All items on the questionnaire were closed-ended. They included three, 
five and seven-point scales as well as nominal qualitative measures and metric measures, 
such as number of employees. 
 
Construction of Summary Scales: At the core of the analysis are a set of summary scales 
composed of multiple items which measure: 1) the importance of the factor as a 
competitive objective and, 2) recent improvement in the factor.  Parallel summary 
measures in each of these categories cover costs, quality, delivery, flexibility in the new 
product development process, and flexibility in the production process.  The content and 
reliability of these ten scales are shown in Table 2.  Each element in each scale was 
measured on a 7-point scale.  In all but one case the reliability as measured by the 
Chronbach ∝  is above the minimum level of 0.6 (Nunally 1967).  The three elements of 
the self reports of performance, shown to be reliable in a wide variety of settings 
(Deshpande and Farley 1999b), produced a reliability measure of 0.81.  Cost objectives 





4.  Some General Results 
The average size of the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) is 688 workers/operators, but 
there is considerable variation as reflected in the standard deviation of 1582.  The total 
number of employees for SOEs is 1106 (standard deviation = 2288), and the total number 
of employees five years ago was 1677 (standard deviation = 3075).  For collective-owned 
enterprises (COEs) the number of workers/operators is 594 (1041), with 931 (1524) total 
employees, and 1135 (1952) total employees five years. Privately-owned enterprises 
(POEs) are slightly smaller at 449 (404) workers/operators, 772 (549) total employees, 
and 880 (756) total employees five years ago. SOEs have downsized by 34% (on 
average), COEs by 18%, and those POEs that existed five years earlier by 12%.  Note 
that there is a potential survivorship bias in all of the downsizing figures. The relative 
sizes of the SOEs, COEs and POEs are consistent with our observations from our visits to 
numerous Chinese firms.  However, it is clear from our survey that some privately-owned 
manufacturing enterprises are quite large and have achieved a remarkable status in a 
socialist, centrally planned economy. 
We examined the differences among the three ownership types for every question.  
Perhaps the most remarkable result from this analysis is the lack of significant difference 
among them.  For the vast majority of questions, there is no significant difference, which 
implies that our conclusions are quite general in their application to all three types of 
Chinese organization.  One exception is the implementation of advanced manufacturing 
technologies, on which SOEs are clearly behind and POEs are clearly ahead.  We plan to 
discuss the results on advanced manufacturing technologies in more detail in a 
subsequent paper.   
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It is interesting to note that SOEs report less planning to reduce workforce size 
than COEs or POEs (though, again, not significantly).  Nevertheless, SOEs are 
significantly lower on a question that dealt with plans to increase production capacity.  In 
other words, they are planning to reduce, or not increase, capacity, but they are not 
planning reducing the workforce size as much as COEs and POEs.  To date, SOEs have 
been constrained in layoffs, so this latter result is consistent with observations of current 
practice.  However, it highlights the problem faced by SOEs.  They must improve, but 
they have few options to pursue; and perhaps they lack the management talent to pursue 
them.  It is probable that early layoffs in SOEs had little effect on productivity because 
the organizations were so bloated.  It is also likely that production capacity increases are 
not sought by SOEs because they often produce products for which there is excess 
industry manufacturing capacity. 
In this light, it is interesting to note that the sign of the Pearson correlation 
coefficients of the three items (number of workers/operators, total employees, and total 
employees five years ago) with the firm performance index are all negative (although not 
significantly). The correlations are –0.103, –0.126 and –0.195, respectively.  In other 
words, firms with more employees apparently achieve worse performance.  In fact, firms 
that were larger five years ago have an even stronger negative association with current 
firm performance.  Perhaps these firms are shedding employees, but the effect has not 
been as positive as one would hope. 
We end this section with some brief comments about the face validity of the 
results.  We shall see below that these firms are more advanced than we had expected.  
One could argue that they simply reported higher values on each question, leading to a 
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false impression.  It seems, however, that this is not so because a number of questions 
received extremely low scores.  For instance, one question asked whether 
“Manufacturing can run small batches at virtually the same cost as larger batches.”  The 
mean response on a 1 – 7 scale was 2.13, much lower than most other questions.  This 
score is clearly consistent with the lack of flexible manufacturing technology in China.  
In a similar vein, we asked a set of questions about the current status of implementation 
of advanced manufacturing technologies, while another set asked for future plans for the 
same technologies.  One of these questions addressed automation in production and the 
mean scores were 1.84 for current status (1 = Not implemented, 2 =In progress, 3 = Fully 
implemented) and 2.14 for future plans (1 = No plan for future investment, 2 = 
Considering to add future investment, 3 = Decided to add future investment).  In other 
words, many firms are in progress, and even more expect to implement in the future.  
Again, this is consistent with our observations.  Finally, one of these questions addressed 
robotics.  The scores for both current status and future plans were extremely low: (means 
of 1.01 and 1.22, respectively).  This data is consistent with our observations of Chinese 
firms.  They are working or planning to work with computer aided design (means of 1.71 
and 2.21, respectively), and with MRP (means of 1.64 and 2.34, respectively), but they 
are not working or planning to work with more expensive and high tech equipment such 
as robotics.  
 
5. Manufacturing Strategy Results 
Two sets of questions relate to the four operations objectives – cost, quality, delivery and 
flexibility. One set asks for the degree of emphasis the company placed on the objectives 
 13
during the past year; for instance, “Reducing product cost,” “Reducing time to introduce 
new products,” and so on.  The mean responses on a 7-point scale are given in Table 3, 
where 1 = “No emphasis” and 7 = “Extreme emphasis.”  A second set asks for the degree 
of improvement in the past year on the identical dimensions (1 = “Much worse and 7 = 
“Much better”). The means for these questions are given in Table 3 as well.  For 
comparison purposes, we have included the results from Robb & Xie (1998). Note that 
these are broken out between foreign invested enterprises (FIEs, or joint ventures) and 
wholly Chinese owned enterprises (WCOEs). Thirteen of the 46 plants surveyed in Robb 
& Xie (1998) were WCOEs. 
It is evident that flexibility is emphasized less than cost, quality or delivery.  We 
define flexibility on three dimensions – new product introduction, product mix and 
volume flexibility (questions 4, 11 &12; question 2; and question 1, respectively).  All of 
these have low scores relative to the other objectives.  The three delivery questions (5, 6 
and 7) score very high, as do the quality questions (8 –10, 13), with the exception of 
improving product durability.  Reducing product cost (question 3) scores relatively high 
as well.  We might argue that low product cost is almost a given in China.  Cost is 
emphasized, improvements are difficult to achieve, but the current emphasis is on 
delivery and quality.   
Note too that the Shanghai firms score higher on every question, with the 
exception of improvements in product cost, than FIEs and WCOEs.  This is not surprising 
given the vibrant nature of business in Shanghai.  Observers suggest that large amounts 
of foreign investment and technology have been pouring into Shanghai and Guangzhou, 
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thereby creating a more modern, competitive environment.  What might be surprising, 
however, is that these firms seem to be intentional about their manufacturing strategy.   
We have argued elsewhere (Pyke 1997) that cost reduction was the major 
emphasis of Western firms during the 1950s and 1960s.  When Japanese automotive and 
consumer electronics made significant inroads in the U.S. in the 1970s and 1980s, quality 
became the dominant concern.  Then, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, flexibility and 
delivery – or time-based competition – came to the fore. (The late 1990s have been 
dominated by supply chain management, a topic we will address in the next section.)  It 
seems that Beijing firms, especially WCOEs, have not yet made the transition to 
competing on the basis of time.  In fact, the major difference between the two surveys is 
that “time” is much more important to the Shanghai firms than the Beijing firms. Note 
that the current research came 18 months later than the Robb and Xie results.  Things are 
changing rapidly in China, and it is possible that the strategic direction of these firms 
would change significantly in such a short time. 
The Pearson correlation coefficients between the competitive objectives 
emphasized and the recent improvements are significant.  This indicates that firms are 
actually improving in the areas they currently emphasize.  In addition, four of the five of 
the competitive objective indices, and all of the recent improvement indices, are 
significantly correlated with the firm performance index (Table 4).  The highest 
correlation is with the recent quality improvement (0.503), followed by the recent factory 
flexibility improvement (0.382).  The lowest is with the cost objective (0.192), which is 
nearly significant (p = 0.056).  It appears that both high emphasis and recent 
improvement on any of the operations objectives correlates with improvement in firm 
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performance.  Note too, however, that for any objective (cost, quality, and so on), recent 
improvement has higher correlation with the firm performance index than does recent 
emphasis on the objective.  This adds to the face validity of the results. 
In 1985, Wheelwright and Hayes identified four stages of competitiveness of 
manufacturing companies (Wheelwright & Hayes 1985).  Stage I companies, for 
instance, look outside for help in solving manufacturing problems and have low skill 
workers and managers.  Stage II firms typically pursue a follower approach to 
implementing new technologies and try to achieve operational parity with competitors.  
Stage III firms formulate a manufacturing strategy and screen their manufacturing 
decisions for consistency with marketing and business strategies.  Finally, Stage IV firms 
anticipate new manufacturing practices and attempt to pursue a manufacturing based 
competitive advantage. They consider both structural (bricks and mortar capacity 
expansion, for instance) and infrastructural (workforce training, for instance) decisions as 
important to strategy.  We asked a set of questions designed to discover the stage of 
manufacturing competitiveness of these firms.  A subset of the results is in Table 5. 
In Table 5, the firms in our sample seem to be in Stage III.  The mean scores for 
questions 1 and 2, which correspond to Stages I and II, are quite low compared to 
questions 3 to 5.  The firms are screening manufacturing decisions for consistency with 
marketing and business strategy, and many are looking to manufacturing for competitive 
advantage.  However, the mean on question 4 (Stage IV) is lower than the mean on 
question 3 (Stage III).  Likewise, the score on training given to workers is quite low, 
implying that perhaps they place greater emphasis on structural decisions than on 
infrastructural issues.   
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In general, these results are somewhat surprising, given the negative press about 
Chinese firms.  One would have expected, perhaps, that they would be mired in Stages I 
or II.  It appears, however, that these firms are more sophisticated than we might have 
expected. Investors should be encouraged to know that there are many Stage III firms that 
at least attempt to formulate and utilize a manufacturing strategy.  Note too that the 
correlations with the firm performance index seem consistent with expectations.  High 
scores on Stage I and II questions are consistently negatively correlated with firm 
performance, whereas high scores on Stage III and IV questions are positively correlated.  
Some of these are significant at the 0.001 level, as noted in the table. 
 
6. Supply Chain Management Results 
Supply chain management (SCM) is the term used to describe the management of 
materials, money and information across the entire supply chain, from suppliers to 
component producers to final assemblers to distribution (warehouses and retailers), and 
ultimately to the consumer. We asked a number of questions aimed at discovering the 
status of SCM in China.  Their means and correlations with the firm performance index 
are listed in Table 6.    
Only one item, “Relationship with our customers,” is significantly correlated with 
the firm performance index.  This is somewhat surprising given the enthusiastic pursuit of 
SCM among U.S. and European firms. Perhaps more surprising is the sign of the 
correlations in some cases.  For example, consulting suppliers about new product 
development (Item 8 in Table 6) is associated with poorer performance.  Western 
automotive and high tech firms are representative of many who place significant 
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emphasis on working with suppliers in developing new products.  The benefits for time-
to-market, product cost and manufacturability are enormous.  At first glance, it would 
appear that Chinese firms have not yet realized the same benefits, or perhaps they are not 
yet at a stage in which they can benefit from closer relationships with their supply chain 
partners. 
 
6.1 Stages of Supply Chain Integration 
Lee outlines a series of four stages of supply chain integration (Lee 1999).  Stage 1 is 
sharing information (about demand or production schedules, for instance); stage 2 is 
exchanging decision rights (such as allowing a vendor to make inventory stocking 
decisions); stage 3 is exchanging work (such as allowing a distributor to perform some 
final assembly and configuration); and stage 4 is an explicit scheme for sharing risks and 
benefits.  We test the first three stages with specific questions (Items 1 – 3 in Table 6).  
We hypothesize that to achieve stage 3, a firm must already share information and 
decision rights.  This would imply that the means of the three items would be in 
descending order (mean of Item 1 > mean of Item 2 > mean of Item 3). In fact, the mean 
of Item 1 is greater than the other two, but the mean of Item 2 is not greater than that of 
Item 3.  In other words, firms share information more than they share decision rights and 
work, but firms share work more than decision rights.   
It is possible that there is a translation issue here.  “Sharing work” might imply 
outsourcing, which is pursued by many firms regardless of recent supply chain initiatives.   
Note that all of the correlations between these three items and the firm performance index 
are in significant.  Finally, the proportion of work subcontracted to outside firms (Item 4) 
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is negatively correlated with the firm performance index (–0.185), which is consistent 
with the result about sharing work.  Once again, it seems that supply chain advances are 
less developed in China.  
6.2 Relationships with Suppliers and Customers 
The firms surveyed communicate more with customers than with suppliers.  Item 5 in 
Table 6 (“Customers are consulted in deciding the production schedule”) and Item 6 
(“Suppliers are consulted…”) have means of 5.28 and 4.38, respectively, and both have 
negative but insignificant correlations with the firm performance index.  Likewise, Item 7 
(“Customers are consulted in deciding which new products to develop”) and Item 8 
(“Suppliers are consulted…”), have means of 6.10 and 4.57, respectively, again with 
insignificant correlations with the firm performance index.  The latter is not too 
surprising: it is much more common to ask customers about new products; consulting 
suppliers in new product development is fairly sophisticated supply chain management. 
However, certain industries rely on suppliers for these decisions.  Personal computer 
manufacturers, for instance, require knowledge of the latest generation of integrated 
circuits.  It is likely that the technical sophistication of many of these products is not at 
the level that would require frequent supplier consultation.   
Further results confirm the conclusion that downstream relationships are closer 
than upstream relationships.  Item 9 in Table 6 (“The relationship between our firm and 
the majority of our suppliers”) has a mean of 5.63, while Item 10 (“The relationship with 
the majority of our customers”) has a mean of 5.99.  Likewise, Item 11 (“We 
communicate with our suppliers – never … often”) has a mean of 5.72, while Item 12 
(“We communicate with our customers…”) has a mean of 6.31.  Respective correlations 
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with the firm performance index are 0.182, 0.314 (significant at the 0.01 level), 0.103, 
and 0.141.  All of the means are well above the value at the middle of the scale (4.00).  t-
tests on the parallel measures of supplier – customer (Item 6 – Item 5, Item 8 – Item 7, 
Item 9 – Item 10, and Item 11 – Item 12) indicate that the customer mean is significantly 
larger than the supplier mean at the 0.001 level.  
We also asked a series of questions about recent improvement actions (1 = Not 
implemented, 2 = Implementation in progress, 3 = Fully Implemented), and about future 
plans (1 = No plan for future investment, 2 = Considering to add future investment, 3 = 
Decided to add future investment).  Recent improvement in relationships with suppliers 
has a mean of 2.39, while recent improvement in relationships with customers has a mean 
of 2.42.  The plans for the future for the same two actions have means 2.82 and 2.89, 
respectively. Neither difference is significant. 
Now let us examine whether firms that communicate with customers, also 
communicate with suppliers.  For instance, Items 11 and 12 in Table 6 (“We 
communicate with our suppliers” and “We communicate with our customers”) are 
correlated at 0.422, which is highly significant.  Items 9 and 10 (“The relationship with 
our suppliers…” and “The relationship with our customers…”) are correlated at 0.509, 
again highly significant.  The same is true of deciding production schedules with 
suppliers and customers (Items 5 and 6, correlation = 0.387), and deciding which new 
products to develop (Items 7 and 8, correlation = 0.318).  It appears that firms that 
communicate do so with both suppliers and customers on at least one dimension.  This 
suggests that some firms are perhaps significantly more advanced in SCM than others. 
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Interestingly, it is not necessarily true that firms that communicate with 
customers, say, do so on many dimensions.  Item 5 (“Customers are consulted in deciding 
the production schedule”) and Item 7 (“Customers are consulted in deciding which new 
products to develop”) are not correlated, and neither are Items 5 and 12 (“We 
communicate with our customers…”).  How do we interpret this?  Is it true that there is 
little relationship between discussing production schedules and overall communication?  
Two points are in order.  First, some firms may need to communicate about production 
schedules but not about new product development.  For instance, if the firm is delivering 
a stable product, such as packaged food, production schedule information could be very 
useful to the customer, but there may be little new product development to discuss.  
Therefore, a low correlation between Items 5 and 12 is not necessarily surprising. 
Second, it may be that communication in the more general question, Item 12, might be 
interpreted as demanding, one-way communication (“You will do what I tell you to.”), 
whereas consulting customers about production schedules implies asking them for their 
preference. The response to Item 12 is very high across the board (high mean, and low 
standard deviation).  It could be that nearly all firms score high on Item 12 because of the 
varieties of communication that fit within the question.  This does not imply that the same 
firms are asking customers for feedback on production schedules. 
Now, let us investigate communication with suppliers.  Item 6 (“Suppliers are 
consulted in deciding the production schedule”) and Item 8 (“Suppliers are consulted in 
deciding which new products to develop”) are correlated 0.342, which is highly 
significant.  Likewise, Items 6 and 9 (“The relationship with our suppliers is close”) have 
correlation of 0.250 (significant at the 0.012 level) and Items 6 and 11 (“We 
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communicate with our suppliers”) have correlation of 0.255 (significant at the 0.011 
level). Compared with customer relationships, it appears that, if there is a relationship on 
one dimension with suppliers, there is a stronger relationship across multiple dimensions. 
Note that Item 8 is significantly correlated with Item 11, but not with Item 9 (correlations 
are 0.239 – significant at the 0.05 level – and 0.085, respectively).  Items 9 and 11 have 
correlation 0.598, which is highly significant, and is expected.  In general, a close 
relationship with suppliers is correlated with communication between the firm and its 
suppliers, and with consultation about production schedules, but not with consultation 
about new products. It would appear that, as on the customer side, communication 
involves several, but not all, dimensions. 
Finally, note that the more general questions (“The relationship between our firm 
and the majority of our suppliers/customers” and “We communicate with our 
suppliers/customers”) all have high means: 5.63, 5.99, 5.72, and 6.31. However, the more 
specific questions have lower means, with one exception.  The items, “We consult our 
customers/suppliers on production schedule and new products,” have means 5.28, 4.38, 
6.10, and 4.57.  The sole exception pertains to consulting customers about which new 
products to develop. 
In summary, there is more communication with customers than with suppliers, 
across the sample.  Firms that communicate with customers tend to do so with suppliers 
as well.  Communication with customers does not necessarily cover multiple dimensions, 
but communication with suppliers more often does.   
 Of course, communication with supply chain partners is not the only supply chain 
initiative that can have value for these Chinese firms.  However, going forward, they 
 22
might do well to learn some lessons from Western firms’ JIT implementation experience.  
Many firms pursued pieces of the JIT tool kit and philosophy without understanding 
which tools applied well to their situation.  Implementing Kanban, for instance, in a job 
shop can result in excessively long lead times and extremely low throughput.  One might 
view the results of our survey as a mandate for Chinese firms to pursue closer 
relationships with suppliers and customers.  However, we would recommend that the 
nature of the relationship be considered with care.  If there is little new product 
development, or if new products do not depend on a particular supplier’s components, 
there is little need for discussion on that topic.  However, if delivery times are important, 
and we have seen above that they increasingly are, communication about production 
schedules and delivery performance might be extremely valuable.  Elsewhere, we have 
argued that managers should form supply chain relationships that fit the complexity and 
uncertainty inherent in the situation (Pyke 1998b).  It seems appropriate to highlight that 
point here.  These firms are not at world class stages of supply chain management.  
However, it will be important for them to think carefully about the initiatives, and related 
relationship styles, they choose to pursue. 
 
7. Conclusion 
The Chinese economy has been booming with private investment, joint ventures, contract 
manufacturing, and even the sale of state-owned enterprises.  How should Western firms 
proceed with their China strategy?  Are state-owned enterprises a good investment?  
What is the status of manufacturing strategy and supply chain management in Chinese 
firms?  This paper has attempted to give some insight into these questions by reporting 
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the results of a survey of 100 state-owned, collective-owned, and privately-owned 
enterprises in the Shanghai region.  We discovered that the differences among these three 
ownership types are generally insignificant.  We also learned that these firms are more 
advanced with explicit manufacturing strategies than we had expected, but they are not as 
advanced in supply chain management as many Western firms.  For example, they report 
significant communication with customers and suppliers – more with customers than 
suppliers – but the nature of the communication is often limited to one dimension, 
particularly on the downstream side. 
 There are other results in our survey that we plan to report later.  This includes 
more in-depth analysis of the supply chain itself.  We are also surveying a number of 
joint venture firms and wholly-owned foreign subsidiaries, using the identical instrument, 
to see if we can further understand differences between wholly owned Chinese firms and 
firms with some foreign ownership interest.  One useful avenue for further research 
would also be case studies that give readers deep insight into the operations, management 
and challenges of these various types of firms in China. 
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Product Line/Industry Number of Firms 
in the Sample 
Consumer goods  
    Durable consumer goods 13 
    Non-durable consumer goods 38 
Goods for industrial / commercial / government uses  
    Manufacturing equipment (capital goods) 15 
    Raw materials or half-finished products 6 
    Parts / components for assembling 15 
    Supplies and other consumption goods 12 
 
Table 1: Industry representation
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(Cronbach ∝ ) 
Competitive Quality Objectives 3 Emphasis on improving product reliability, 
improving quality consistency, good after-
sale service 
0.66 
    
Improvement in Quality Performance 4 Improved product reliability, improving 
quality consistency, good after-sale service, 
increasing product durability 
0.75 
    
Competitive Delivery Objectives 3 Emphasis on time for completion, delivery 
and meeting due dates 
0.69 
    
Improvement in Delivery 3 Improved time for completion, delivery and 
meeting due dates 
0.86 
    
Competitive New Product Flexibility 
Objectives 
3 Emphasis on reducing time to introduction, 
adding functions, introducing more products 
0.68 
    
Improvement in New Product 
Flexibility 
3 Improvement in time to introduction, adding 
functions and new product introductions 
0.69 
    
Competitive Factory Flexibility 
Objectives 
2 Emphasis on ability to change product 
volume and product mix 
0.33 
    
Improvement in Factory Flexibility 2 Improvement in ability to change product 
volume and product mix 
0.61 
    
Improvement in Performance 3 Improved market share, profitability and 
return on sales 
0.83 
 





 Shanghai1   Beijing   
   FIE2  WCOE FIE WCOE 
 Degree of 
Emphasis 





Description Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean 
1. Ability to vary production 
volume at any time 
5.79 5.68 5.0 4.5 5.3 5.3 
2. Ability to product a different 
mix of products 
5.70 5.67 5.0 5.3 5.4 5.3 
3. Reducing product cost 
 
6.12 4.73 5.5 5.3 5.2 4.8 
4. Reducing time to introduce 
new products 
5.21 5.01 5.0 4.8 5.0 4.9 
5. Reducing time from customer 
order to completion 
6.28 6.05 5.7 4.9 5.3 4.9 
6. Rapid delivery to customer 
(after production) 
6.10 6.17 5.8 4.5 5.3 4.8 
7. Meeting customer due dates 
 
6.47 6.17 6.4 4.8 5.4 4.6 
8. Improving product reliability 
 
6.29 5.92 5.8 5.5 5.5 4.9 
9. Improving product durability 
 
5.15 5.52 4.8 4.9 5.0 4.8 
10. Improving consistency in 
product quality 
6.23 5.55 5.1 5.8 5.1 5.2 
11. Adding new functions to 
existing products 
4.82 4.87 3.9 4.0 4.8 4.7 
12.Introducing more new 
products 
5.48 5.20 5.3 4.8 5.1 4.9 
13. Providing good after sale 
service 
6.31 5.90 5.8 5.3 5.2 4.9 
 
Table 3: Mean scores for operations objectives – degree of emphasis in the 
past year and improvement in the past year 
 
 
                                                 
1 There were 100 firms in the Shanghai sample, and 33 FIEs and 13 WCOEs in the Beijing sample. 










Competitive objective  
   Cost 0.19 (0.06) 
   Quality 0.28 (0.01) 
   Delivery 0.20 (0.04) 
   New Product Flexibility 0.30 (0.00) 
   Factory Flexibility 0.21 (0.04) 
Recent Improvement  
   Cost 0.23 (0.02) 
   Quality 0.50 (0.00) 
   Delivery 0.23 (0.03) 
   New Product Flexibility 0.33 (0.00) 
   Factory Flexibility 0.38 (0.00) 
 
Table 4: Correlation between competitive objective and recent improvement 





Description Mean Correlation with Firm 
Performance Index 
1. We always obtain assistance from 
external experts to solve manufacturing 
issues 
3.93 –0.08 
2. We only consider implementing new 
manufacturing practices or technologies if 
they have been adopted successfully by our 
competitors  
3.34 –0.09 
3. Manufacturing decisions are screened for 
consistency with marketing and business 
strategies 
6.44 0.33*** 
4. Competitive advantage is sought by 
having manufacturing participate in making 
marketing, engineering and business 
strategy decisions 
5.99 0.15 
5. Our factory is able to pursue multiple 
competitive objectives simultaneously 
5.39 0.33*** 
6. Level of training given to workers 4.38 0.34*** 
 
Table 5: Mean scores for stages of manufacturing competitiveness and 














1.  Competitive advantage is sought by sharing information with our suppliers 
or customers (1 = “Strongly disagree”, 7 = “Strongly agree”) 
6.55 0.03 (0.74) 
2. Competitive advantage is sought by making production or inventory 
decisions for our suppliers or our customers, or by having them making 
decisions for us. (1 = “Strongly disagree”, 7 = “Strongly agree”) 
5.15 0.01 (0.94) 
3.  Competitive advantage is sought by performing some of our suppliers or 
customers work for them, or by having them perform some of our work. 
(1 = “Strongly disagree”, 7 = “Strongly agree”) 
5.34 –0.08 (0.41) 
4. Proportion of overall production process subcontracted to outside firms. (1 
= “Strongly disagree”, 7 = “Strongly agree”) 
3.02 –0.19 (0.07) 
5. Our customers are consulted in deciding the production schedule (1 = 
“Strongly disagree”, 7 = “Strongly agree”)  
5.28 –0.03 (0.74) 
6.  Our suppliers are consulted in deciding the production schedule (1 = 
“Strongly disagree”, 7 = “Strongly agree”) 
4.38 –0.06 (0.56) 
7.  Our customers are consulted in deciding which new products to develop (1 
= “Strongly disagree”, 7 = “Strongly agree”) 
6.10 0.00 (0.98) 
8.  Our suppliers are consulted in deciding which new products to develop (1 = 
“Strongly disagree”, 7 = “Strongly agree”) 
4.57 –0.09 (0.39) 
9.  The relationship between our firm and the majority of our suppliers is: (1 = 
“Very weak”, 7 = “Very strong”) 
5.63 0.18 (0.07) 
10. The relationship between our firm and the majority of our customers is: (1 
= “Very weak”, 7 = “Very strong”) 
5.99 0.31 (0.00) 
11. We communicate with our suppliers (1= “Never”, 7 = “Often”) 5.72 0.10 (0.31) 
12. We communicate with our customers (1= “Never”, 7 = “Often”) 6.31 0.14 (0.16) 
 






(1997a). China's Economy in 1995-97 (APLA 97-10008). Washington, D.C.: Directorate 
of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency. 
(1997b, September 13). China's Next Steps: The Long March to Capitalism. The 
Economist, 23-26. 
(1999, September 25). Infatuation's end. The Economist, 71-73. 
Broadman, H. G. (1999). The Chinese State as Corporate Shareholder. Finance & 
Development(September), 52-55. 
Browne, A. (2000, January 4). China Looks to Private Business for Answers. Reuters. 
Deshpande, R., & Farley, J. U. (1999a). Market Focused Organizational Transformation 
in China. Journal of Global Marketing(forthcoming). 
Deshpande, R., & Farley, J. U. (1999b). Reliability in Measuring Market Orientation and 
Financial Performance in Transition Economies. In Rajiv Batra (Ed.), Marketing 
Issues in Transition Economies (pp. 127-138). Boston: Klewer Academic 
Publishers. 
Dong, J. L., & Hu, J. (1995). Mergers and Acquisitions in China. Economic Review, 
Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta(November/December), 15-29. 
Eckert, P. (2000, January 12). Reuters. 
McDermott, C. M., Greis, N. P., & Fischer, W. A. (1997). The diminishing utility of the 
product/process matrix:  A study of the US power tool industry. International 
Journal of Operations and Production Management, 17(1), 65-84. 
 30
Hum, S. H., & Leow, L. H. (1996). Strategic manufacturing effectiveness: an empirical 
study based on the Hayes-Wheelwright model. International Journal of 
Operations and Production Management, 16(4), 4-18. 
Jefferson, G. H. (1999). China's State-Owned Enterprises Did Their Job -- Now They 
Can Go. Transition(October), 331-32. 
Lee, H. L. (1999). Personal Communication. 
Lihong, Z., & Goffin, K. (1999). Joint venture manufacturing in China:  an exploratory 
investigation. International Journal of Operations and Production Management, 
19(5/6), 474-490. 
Luk, S. T. K. (1998). Structural changes in China's distribution system. International 
Journal of Physical Distribution & Logistics Management, 28(1), 44-67. 
Nunally, J. (1967). Psychometric Theory. New York: McGraw Hill Book Company. 
Pyke, D. F. (1997). A Note on Operations Strategy. The Amos Tuck School of Business 
Administration, Hanover, NH. 
Pyke, D. F. (1998a). Guangzhou Machine Tool. In H. L. Lee & S. M. Ng (Eds.), Global 
Supply Chain and Technology Management (Vol. 1, pp. 205-215): Production and 
Operations Management Society. 
Pyke, D. F. (1998b, February 20). Strategies for Global Sourcing. Financial Times, pp. 2-
4. 
Robb, D. J., & Xie, B. (1998). A Survey of Operations Strategy in China-based 
Manufacturing Enterprises. Unpublished Working Paper, Auckland, New 
Zealand. 
 31
Robb, D. J., & Xie, B. (2000). Appropriate Manufacturing Strategy in China: A Case 
Study. International Journal of Technology Management, forthcoming. 
Roberts, D., & Crock, S. (1999). How Zhu's Foes Could Undermine His Reforms. 
Business Week(July 19), 67. 
Roberts, D., Prasso, S., & Clifford, M. L. (1999). China's New Revolution. Business 
Week(September 27), 72-77. 
Roh, B.-H., & Whybark, C. D. (1993). Comparing Manuvacturing Practices in the 
People's Republic of China and South Korea. In D. C. Whybark & H. Vastag 
(Eds.), Global Manufacturing Practices: A Worldwide Survey of Practices in 
Production Planning and Control . Amsterdam: Elsevier Science. 
Silver, E. A., Pyke, D. F., & Peterson, R. (1998). Inventory Management and Production 
Planning and Scheduling. (3 ed.). New York: John Wiley & Sons. 
Steinfeld, E. S. (1998). Forging Reform in China: The Fate of State-Owned Industry. 
New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. 
Wheelwright, S. (1984). Manufacturing Strategy: Defining the Missing Link. Strategic 
Management Journal, 5(1), 77-91. 
Wheelwright, S., & Hayes, R. (1985). Competing Through Manufacturing. Harvard 
Business Review, 99-109. 
Yu, C.-S., Cochran, D. S., & Spencer, B. (1998). Quality Management Practices in 
China. Quality Management Journal, 98(5), 91-106. 
Zhu, C. (2000, January 4). Reuters. 
